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Abstract
We develop an overlapping generations model of growth and the environment in which industrial ﬁrms
produce environmentally harmful emissions. A government controls the emissions by assigning emission
quotas to ﬁrms,and permits could be issued and freely traded as ﬁnancial instruments across ﬁrms on
the basis of the quotas. We show that an environmental policy that decreases an aggregate number of
emission quotas could degenerate economic growth and lower environmental quality in the long run.
We also show the implications of this result for environmental policy.
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An emission permits system accompanied by the assignment of quotas on emission levels is one
of the most eﬀective instruments to control environmentally harmful emissions. A government
assigns quotas on emissions to polluters (for example, industrial ﬁrms), and polluters are issued
emissions permits on the basis of quotas and freely trade them in a market to in order to satisfy
their need to produce emissions. If a government assigns permits of lower limits to polluting
industries, the emission levels decrease but the business activity of polluters may be hampered.
Thus, analyzing the eﬀects of emission permits is important in view of sustainable development,
which is a central economic issue in many countries.
A large number of studies have been conducted on environmental policy and economic growth.
However, most of them are related to environmental tax policy;1 few consider emissions permits
and economic growth despite the increasing concern on tradable emission permits for protection
of the environment. Exceptions are Stokey (1998) and Grimaud (1999), who introduce emissions
permits as an instrument of achieving optimal capital allocation and environmental protection.
However, they do not analyze how a decrease in the aggregate number of permits aﬀects growth
and the environment, which has been one of the most signiﬁcant issues in environmental policy
since the Kyoto Congress in 1997. In this paper, we intend to consider this unresolved issue.
To execute our aim, in Section 2 we develop an overlapping generations model of growth and
the environment, which is based on studies by John and Pecchenino (1994) and John et al. (1995).
In particular, we assume that industrial ﬁrms produce environmentally harmful emissions, and
1 Examples are as follows: Lighanrt and van der Ploeg (1994),van der Ploeg and Withagen (1991),and
Mohtadi (1996) focus on optimal emission charge in the context of a dynamic pollution problem embedded in
the Ramsey model,while John et al. (1995),Marini and Scaramozzino (1995),Fisher and van Marrewijk (1998),
and Jouvet,Michel,and Vidal (2000) examine optimal tax schemes to decentralize an intergenerationally eﬃcient
allocation in an overlapping generations model of growth and the environment. Bovenberg and Smulders (1995,
1996),Bovenberg and de Mooij (1997),and Bovenberg and Heijdra (1998) examine the eﬀects of environmental
tax policy and/or reform on growth and welfare.
1that these emissions are regulated by assignment of quotas on emissions. In Section 3, we show
that, for some number of quotas, there exist two nontrivial steady state equilibria: the one
is unstable equilibrium with low capital and low environmental quality, and the other is stable
equilibrium with high capital and high environmental quality. An equilibrium path would initially
display environmental deterioration and capital accumulation and later exhibit environmental
improvement and capital accumulation; it ﬁnally converges to a stable steady state.
In Section 4, we focus on stable steady state equilibrium and then show the main result: a
decrease in the number of quotas on emissions may be harmful to both growth and the environ-
ment. A decrease in the number of quotas on emissions has two eﬀects: positive and negative
income eﬀects. The former is an increase in environmental assets bequeathed by the previous
generations. This positive eﬀect leads to an increase in savings and investment in the environ-
ment, which enhances capital accumulation and environmental improvement. The latter is a
decrease in private assets. This negative eﬀect leads to a reduction in savings and investment
for environmental maintenance, which in turn lowers capital and environmental quality. For
some cases, the negative eﬀect overcomes the positive one; a decrease in the quotas that aim to
reduce the ﬂow of emissions results in capital dissipation and environmental deterioration in the
long run. We also show the implication of this result for environmental policy. In Section 5, we
provide the concluding remarks.
2 The Model
Consider an inﬁnite-horizon economy composed of perfectly competitive ﬁrms and ﬁnitely-lived
agents. A new generation (called generation t) is born in each period t =1 ,2,..., and lives for
two periods, youth and old age. We assume no population growth and normalize the size of each
generation as unity. Agents are identical in each generation.
2There is a continuum of identical ﬁrms. They are perfectly competitive proﬁt maximizers
that produce ﬁnal good Yt using the production function
Yt = ˜ A(Kt)
α(Lt)
1−αzt, (1)
where ˜ A is a productivity scalar, Kt is the total quantity of capital in period t, Lt is the total
employment in period t, zt is the intensity of pollution, and α ∈ (0,1) is a constant parameter.
We do not make an index for each ﬁrm except for the case in which we need indexation to explain
the behavior of each ﬁrm clearly. Capital depreciates in the process of production at the rate
δ ∈ [0,1].
The activity of production leads to a ﬂow of environmentally harmful emissions
Pt = Yt(zt)
θ, (2)
where θ>0 is constant. A larger θ implies more emissions given the ﬁnal output. Elimination
of zt between the production function (1) and the emission function (2) leads to













where A ≡ ( ˜ A)
θ
1+θ,α K ≡ αθ/(1+θ),α L ≡ θ(1−α)/(1+θ), and αP ≡ 1/(1+θ). This production
function has constant returns to scale since αK + αL + αP =1 .
The long-lived government assigns in each period quotas on emissions to ﬁrms in order to
control their emissions. Let S>0 be the aggregate number of quotas assigned to ﬁrms in each
period and let Si > 0 be the number of quotas assigned to ﬁrm i where

Sidi = S. We could
interpret that the participants in the world congress (for example, the Kyoto Congress in 1997)
decide the total number of quotas, S, assigned to each state, and that each state distributes the
quotas to domestic ﬁrms in order to execute the agreement.2 Emissions permits could be issued
2 There is no international trade of emissions permits in our model.
3and freely traded as ﬁnancial instruments between ﬁrms on the basis of the quotas. There is a
competitive market for these permits, where the unit price is qt. Each ﬁrm is a price taker in the
market. If ﬁrm i emits P i
t <S i(>S i) units, then it can sell Si −P i
t units (buy P i
t −Si units) of
permits in the market at the price qt.




αP − ρtKt − wtLt + qt(S − Pt)
where ρt is the rental price of capital and Pt − S is the net demand of permits. Let denote










where (4) - (6) state that ﬁrms hire capital (Kt) and labor (Lt) and emits pollution (Pt) until
the marginal products equal the factor prices. Constant returns to scale and perfect competition
taking together mean that payments to factors of production will exhaust every proﬁt-maximizing
producer’s revenue, leaving the endowment of permits, qtS, for proﬁts. We assume that these
proﬁts are distributed to young agents by the long-lived government.
The budget equation of the long-lived government in period t is τl
t = qtS, where τl
t is the
aggregate amount of transfers to households. The long-lived government cannot control both
the price qt and the quotas S since the price qt is determined in the market and the quotas S
is decided by the world congress. Thus, it cannot aﬀect the amount of lump-sum transfer. The
taskof the long-lived government is to transfer the revenue of emission trading from ﬁrms to
households in each period.
4Agents born in period t have preferences over consumption in old age, ct+1, and an index of
the quality of the environment when they consume, Et+1. These preferences are represented by
the utility function lnct+1+µlnEt+1, where µ>0 is a parameter of environmental concern. The
larger µ implies more concern for the environment.
Young agents are each endowed with one unit of labor which they supply to ﬁrms inelastically.
They divide their wage, wt, and the lump-sum transfer from the long-lived government, τl
t,
between savings for consumption in old age, st, and investment in the environment, mt. In old
age, agents supply their savings to ﬁrms and earn the gross return (1 + rt+1).
Environmental quality is an intergenerational public good that is reduced by emissions caused
by ﬁrms, Pt, but that can be improved by maintenance investment, mt. This mechanism is
expressed by
Et+1 =( 1− b)Et − βPt + γmt,
where b ∈ (0,1) measures the speed of the autonomous change in environmental quality, β>0
is a parameter which evaluates the eﬀect of emissions on environmental quality, and γ>0i sa
parameter that represents the eﬃciency of environmental maintenance. The second term in the
right-hand side, βPt, is an externality caused by ﬁrms.
Our formula of environmental quality is based on the workof John and Pecchenino (1994)
and John et al. (1995) but diﬀers from theirs in the assumption of environmental externality.
They assume that the source of environmentally harmful externality is consumption by past
generations: Et+1 =( 1− b)Et − βct + γmt. They adopt this formula to focus on consumption
externality across generations. On the other hand, we assume that ﬁrms cause the ﬂow of
emissions during the process of production, and that the harmful eﬀects of emissions on the
environment accumulate toward the future. We adopt this formula to examine the regulation of
emissions by ﬁrms by introducing tradeable emission permits.
5Following John and Pecchenino (1994) and John et al. (1995), we assume that a short-lived
government representing the young chooses the maintenance investment mt and savings st to
maximize the utility of generation t on the condition that the old are not made worse oﬀ by
this decision.3 Given the wage, wt, the return on savings, rt+1, environmental quality at the
beginning of period t, Et, the quantity of emissions by ﬁrms, Pt, and the lump-sum transfer τl
t,





st + mt = wt + τ
l
t, (7)
ct+1 =( 1+rt+1)st, (8)
Et+1 =( 1− b)Et − βPt + γmt, (9)
st,m t ≥ 0,
where (7) and (8) are budget constraints and (9) is an environmental equation. The ﬁrst order
conditions of this problem are (7), (8), (9), and
γµct+1 ≤ (1 + rt+1)Et+1; an equality holds if mt > 0. (10)
(10) implies that the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and environmental
quality, Et+1/µct+1, is equal to or greater than the marginal rate of transformation, γ/(1+rt+1).
3 Equilibrium
This section investigates existence and stability of the equilibrium.
There are two input markets: one for capital and one for emission permits. A capital market
clearing condition is stLt = Kt+1, which says that total savings by young agents in generation t,
3 We should notice that there are two types of government in our model: long-lived and short-lived governments.
6stLt, must equal their purchase of used capital stockfrom old agents in generation t−1, (1−δ)Kt,
plus their own addition to the future stock, Kt+1 − (1 − δ)Kt. A market clearing condition of
emissions permits is Pt = S, which says that the total amount of emissions, Pt, must equal the
total number of tradable emissions permits, S, which is based on quotas on emissions. Since
Lt = 1 for all t, 4 these two conditions are rewritten as
st = kt+1, (11)
pt = S. (12)
The markets for renting and purchasing physical capital are competitive; the opportunity cost
of owning equipment for one period should equal the relevant rental rate. Then, an arbitrage
condition of the form rt+1 + δ = ρt+1 or
1+rt+1 =1− δ + ρt+1 (13)
holds in equilibrium.
Deﬁnition: An equilibrium is a sequence {ct,E t,s t,m t,p t,ρ t,w t,q t,k t,r t}∞
t=1 such that, in each
period, (i) agents maximize utility subject to the constraints, (ii) ﬁrms maximize proﬁts,
and (iii) markets clear, given the initial condition {k1,E 1}.
An equilibrium sequence {ct,E t,s t,m t,p t,ρ t,w t,q t,k t,r t}∞
t=1with the initial condition {k1,E 1}
is characterized by the ﬁrst order conditions of proﬁt maximization, (4) - (6), the ﬁrst order
conditions of utility maximization, (7) - (10), two input markets clearing conditions, (11) and
(12), and the arbitrage condition, (13).
4 In the labor market,the supply is one unit and the demand is Lt units. Thus, Lt = 1 is the labor market
clearing condition.
7By summarizing (4)-(13), the equilibrium path with the initial condition {k1,E 1} is charac-
terized by the sequence {kt,m t,E t}∞
t=1 which satisﬁes
γµkt+1 ≤ Et+1,equality holds if mt > 0 (14)
mt + kt+1 =( 1− αK)A(S)
αP(kt)
αK, (15)
Et+1 =( 1− b)Et − βS + γmt. (16)
(14) corresponds to the ﬁrst-order condition of the utility maximization, (10).5 (15) is a
rewrite of the budget equation in youth, and (16) is a rewrite of an environmental equation. The
steady state equilibrium is an allocation such that {k,m,E} are stationary along the equilibrium
path. In the steady state, it must hold that m>0; if m =0 , then (16) is reduced to E =
−βS/b< 0 which contradicts the inequality constraint E>0.6
In what follows, we ﬁrst consider the cases of mt = 0 and mt > 0, respectively. After that, we
show that there exists a nontrivial stable steady state equilibrium with m>0 under a certain
condition.
Zero Maintenance Case
When mt =0 , (14) - (16) are rewritten as
γµ(1 − αK)A(S)
αP(kt)
αK ≤ (1 − b)Et − βS, (17)
kt+1 =( 1− αK)A(S)
αP(kt)
αK, (18)
Et+1 =( 1− b)Et − βS. (19)
The equilibrium path of capital and environmental quality under zero maintenance is charac-
5 When a generation chooses to invest in the environment,(14) holds with equality; there is no trade-oﬀ between
capital (growth) and the environment. This positive relation holds since a generation chooses consumption and
environmental quality to equate the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and environmental quality
to the marginal rate of transformation in view of its utility maximization.
6 A log-linear utility function requires E>0.
8terized by (17) - (19). The inequality (17) is a zero maintenance condition,7 which means that
generation t chooses to invest nothing in the environment if a pair of kt and Et, which is given for
generation t, satisﬁes (17). Figure 1 depicts a zero maintenance curve. In the region above this
curve, environmental quality is suﬃciently high and/or a level of capital stockis suﬃciently low
so that a generation chooses not to engage in environmental maintenance. We call such region
a zero maintenance area.
In the zero maintenance area, (18) yields the locus of capital stockcharacterized by
kt+1 ≥ kt ⇔ kt ≤ (1 − αK)A(S)
αP(kt)
αK.
As depicted in Figure 1, in the zero maintenance area capital stockcontinues to increase (de-
crease) on the left (right) side of the line characterizing the steady state level of capital stock,
k = {(1 − αK)A(S)αP}1/(1−αK).
(19) yields the locus of environmental quality characterized by
Et+1 ≤ Et ⇔ Et ≥− βS/b.
Environmental quality continues to decrease over time because of lackof maintenance investment
and the externality of emissions. Thus, the equilibrium path with zero maintenance will break
through the zero maintenance curve; that is, there is no steady state equilibrium with m =0 .
For some period t, a new generation born in that period will ﬁnd it worthwhile to invest in the
environment. We therefore next consider the equilibrium path with positive maintenance.
Positive Maintenance Case
When mt > 0, (15) - (16) are reduced to
Et+1 =( 1− b)Et − βS + γ{(1 − αK)A(S)
αP(kt)
αK − kt+1}.
7 We obtain this condition by replacing kt+1 and Et+1 in (14) with kt and Et.
9With (14), the above equation is rewritten as











The positive maintenance condition is mt =( 1− αK)A(S)αP(kt)αK − kt+1 > 0, or
kt+1 < ˜ G(kt) ≡ (1 − αK)A(S)
αP(kt)
αK. (21)
Therefore, the equilibrium path of capital under positive maintenance is characterized by (20)
and (21).
Figure 2 depicts the functions G(kt) and ˜ G(kt) in the kt − kt+1 space. Below ˜ G(kt), the
equilibrium path displays positive maintenance. The function G(kt) may cut the 450 line twice,
which means that there may exist two nontrivial steady state equilibria. In what follows, we
derive the range of quotas S that ensures the existence of multiple steady state equilibria with
positive maintenance.













Proof: Let ˜ k denote k which satisﬁes ˜ G(k)=k (see Fig. 2). Direct calculation leads to:




We ﬁrst show that ˜ G(k) >G (k) for any k ∈ (0,˜ k). We then show that G(k)=k has two
solutions kH and kL where 0 <k L <k H < ˜ k if and only if S ∈ (0, ¯ S).





















which is rewritten as (1 − αK)A(S)
αP ≥ (1 − b)(k)1−αK. The left-hand side of this inequality is
constant while the right-hand side increases in k. Thus, we have ˜ G(k) >G (k) for any k ∈ (0,˜ k)
if (1 − αK)A(S)
αP ≥ (1 − b)(˜ k)1−αK, that is,
(1 − αK)A(S)
αP ≥ (1 − b)(1 − αK)A(S)
αP .
Since the above inequality always holds, we ﬁnd that the inequality ˜ G(k) >G (k) always
holds for k ∈ (0,˜ k).
Let ˆ k denote k which satisﬁes G (k)=1 . For the purpose of ensuring the existence of two
solutions for k ∈ (0,˜ k), it is necessary and suﬃcient to show the range of S which satisﬁes










αK > ˆ k. (23)








Substituting (24) into (23) and rearranging, we obtain
¯ S ≡











Thus, there exist two solutions of G(k)=k in the range of k ∈ (0, ˜ k) if and only if S ∈ (0, ¯ S).
Q.E.D.
The source of multiple equilibria is environmental externality of emissions, −βP. If there is no
external eﬀect, β =0 , then the scalar system characterizing the equilibrium path under positive
11maintenance (20) has a unique nontrivial steady state equilibrium. Externality of emissions is a
key factor that generates multiple equilibria.
Let eH(eL) denote the equilibrium with high (low) capital, kH(kL). At eH(eL) equilibrium,
the slope of G(·) function is less (greater) than one (see Fig. 2); that is, the eH(eL) equilibrium
is stable (unstable). Suppose that the equilibrium path enters the positive maintenance area in
period T. If kT <k L, the equilibrium path converges to the trivial steady state equilibrium with
k =0 . If kT = kL, the equilibrium path continues to stay at eL equilibrium. If kT ∈ (kL,˜ k), the
equilibrium path monotonically converges to eH equilibrium.
A possible equilibrium path is as follows: Given suﬃciently low k1 and suﬃciently high E1, the
equilibrium path initially displays environmental deterioration and capital accumulation in the
zero maintenance area and later exhibits environmental improvement and capital accumulation
in the positive maintenance area. The equilibrium path ﬁnally converges to the stable steady
state equilibrium, eH. This possible path displays a U-shaped relationship between growth and
the environment, which is identical to the path shown in John and Pecchenino (1994).
4 The Eﬀects ofEmission Permits on Growth and the
Environment
In this section, we consider a situation in which a world congress decided to decrease the quotas
on emissions in each country. We investigate how the change in the number of quotas on emissions
aﬀects capital accumulation and environmental quality in the long run. In particular, we focus
on the nontrivial stable steady state equilibrium eH.













12Proof: Diﬀerentiating (20) with respect to k and S and evaluating it at the steady state
















The sign of the diﬀerential coeﬃcient of dk, 1 − G (kH), is positive since G (kH) < 1.
























The last equality holds from (24). Thus, the diﬀerential coeﬃcient of dS is positive if the












Let ˆ S denote the left-hand side of the above inequality. We can immediately ﬁnd ˆ S<¯ S.
Then, we have dk/dS > 0i fS ∈ (0, ˆ S). Since E = γµk holds, we have dE/dS > 0i fS ∈ (0, ˆ S).
Q.E.D.
This proposition implies that, although a decrease in the number of quotas on emissions
reduces the ﬂow of environmentally harmful emissions, p, it could eventually result in capital
dissipation and environmental deterioration in the long run. To understand the result, consider











{(1 − b)Et − βS}.
The right hand side is the total income of generation t. The ﬁrst term, wt, is wage income,
and the second term, τl
t, is the lump-sum transfer from the long-lived government. These two
are private goods assets exogenously given for generation t. The third term, {(1−b)Et −βS}/γ,
13is an environmental asset bequeathed from generation t − 1 to generation t. In equilibrium,
a decrease in S has two negative income eﬀects: a reduction in wage income, wt, and the
transfer, τl
t = qtS, since wt and qtS are increasing in S (see (5) and (6)). These negative income
eﬀects lead to a reduction in investment for environmental maintenance, which in turn lowers
future environmental quality. On the other hand, a decrease in S has a positive income eﬀect
in equilibrium: an increase in environmental assets, {(1 − b)Et − βS}/γ, which improves future
environmental quality. At eH equilibrium, the negative eﬀect overcomes the positive one if
S ∈ (0, ˆ S).
Proposition 2 has the following implication for environmental policy. It is often argued that a
country should be assigned a smaller number of quotas on emissions to control environmentally
harmful emissions. In our model, such an argument is not necessary true. If the initial assign-
ment of quotas satisﬁes S ∈ (0, ˆ S), then a decrease in S results in environmental deterioration.
Therefore, an environmental policy that aims to decrease a ﬂow of emissions is not necessarily
beneﬁcial to environmental preservation in the long run.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we develop an overlapping generations model of growth and the environment
base on the workof John and Pecchenino (1994) and John et al. (1995). They focus on con-
sumption externality across generations and who a tax-transfer scheme in order to achieve an
intergenerationally eﬃcient allocation. In contrast to them, this paper focuses on environmental
deterioration caused by emissions of industrial ﬁrms and examines how a decrease in quotas on
emissions aﬀects growth and the environment. We ﬁnd that, although an environmental policy
that decreases the number of quotas reduces the ﬂow of environmentally harmful emissions, it
could result in environmental deterioration in the long run. The result implies that we must take
14account of the long-run consequence of an emissions permits system when we introduce it as an
instrument of environmental preservation.
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